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ABSTRACT
We study the accumulation of human capital and the behavior of consumption and earnings in
a life cycle equilibrium model with endogenous borrowing constraints. Constraints arise endogenously
from the inalienability of human capital and the limited punishments that creditors are able to impose on
those who default. The endogeneity of borrowing constraints produces a number of interesting
relationships. First, efficient borrowing limits are functions of individual observable characteristics and
choices, especially ability and human capital investments.  The connection between human capital
investments and borrowing limits creates additional incentives to invest beyond those present in models
with exogenous constraints. Second, government policies affect the incentives to default and, hence, the
limits on private borrowing. As opposed to exogenous constraint models, additional subsidies for
investment in human capital should be accompanied by increases in credit, since borrowers are more able
to re-pay higher debts. Finally, general equilibrium considerations have an additional role, since
borrowing limits depend on the returns to physical and human capital.
We calibrate the model to U.S. data and are able to replicate key features of the economy
regarding human capital investment, earnings, and consumption. The calibrated model is then used to
study the steady state impacts of changes in government policies. We find that changes in bankruptcy
laws can have sizeable effects on the accumulation of both human and physical capital. At the aggregate
level, general equilibrium forces are important and can reverse the results predicted in partial equilibrium.
Government subsidies to education (financed with a proportional tax on earnings) cause lenders to
increase credit limits and substantially increase aggregate human  and physical capital. Most importantly,
we show that the implications of our model are very different from those of standard exogenous constraint
models.  For example, the effects of increases in initial wealth and government  subsidies on investment
are substantially greater in our model than in a similar model with exogenous constraints.
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Hoover Institution Department of Economics
Stanford University Northwestern University
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This paper develops a framework for analyzing the life cycle behavior of human and physical capital
accumulation in general equilibrium environments where credit constraints arise endogenously from
individual incentive problems. There are three primary objectives. The ¯rst is to understand
how credit constraints arise endogenously in an e±cient contracting environment with life cycle
decisionmaking. Because creditors are limited in the punishments they can impose on borrowers
that default, lenders will restrict the amount of credit they extend.1 In our framework, these limits
depend on the future earnings capacity of borrowers. In contrast to models that impose exogenous
borrowing constraints, individuals of heterogeneous abilities or those making di®erent schooling
choices will face di®erent borrowing limits. Constraints will also vary over the life cycle for similar
reasons. In short, borrowing limits are functions of ability, age, and human capital investment
choices in an e±cient lending environment.2
The second objective of the paper is to examine the implications of government policies when
borrowing constraints arise endogenously, incorporating the interaction between policies and credit
constraints. Policies like public schooling, education subsidies, and income taxation will alter
constraint levels in an e±cient contracting environment. As a result, previous analyses that ex-
ogenously ¯x constraints are misleading. For example, college subsidies are often discussed as a
substitute for student loans. However, we ¯nd that with e±cient credit markets and endogenously
determined borrowing limits, lending should increase in response to an increase in subsidies to
schooling. This is because the subsidies encourage additional investments in human capital, which
reduces incentives to default. Thus, subsidy and loan policies can be better seen as complements
rather than substitutes.
Finally, insights from endogenous constraint models can be used for evaluating and better
designing actual student loan programs. For example, in the United States, it is important to
understand how the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program a®ects incentives to invest in human
capital, interacts with e±cient credit markets, and generates incentives to default. More e±cient
loan programs may be possible and can only be found with a better understanding of the incentives
in the program and in private credit markets.
The framework developed in this paper recognizes that credit laws typically create stronger
incentives for individuals with higher earnings potential to repay their debt, because penalties for
default disproportionately disrupt their life cycle consumption patterns. (For example, the inability
1Fay, Hurst, and White [20] empirically show that households are more likely to declare bankruptcy when the
¯nancial bene¯ts of doing so are greater. Gropp, Scholz, and White [22] estimate that households living in states with
larger bankruptcy asset exemptions are more likely to have their loan applications rejected and to be discouraged
from borrowing. Monge, et al. [40] and the other studies in Pagano [42] examine how incentives to default translate
into borrowing constraints in di®erent countries.
2See Jappelli [28] and Fay, Hurst, and White [20] for empirical evidence on these relationships.
2to borrow additional funds for years after default or bankruptcy can be extremely costly for someone
with sharply increasing earnings pro¯les who would like to smooth consumption over time.) As a
result, they can obtain relatively high amounts of credit. Those with low earnings potential have
little incentive to repay loans and, consequently, face more stringent constraints. Human capital
theory indicates that the more able an individual and the more he invests in his skills, the more
earnings potential he will possess. In an e±cient credit market, he should, therefore, be allowed
to borrow more. That is, e±cient credit markets establish a connection between credit limits
and the observable characteristics and human capital investments of individuals, an implication
consistent with recent empirical work by Keane and Wolpin. [31] The link between human capital
investments and the amount of available credit generates additional incentives to invest in human
capital{incentives that do not exist in models of exogenously determined borrowing constraints.
Constraints will also depend on the age of borrowers. At early ages, exclusion from lending
markets may be costly, while it is not at older ages. In contrast, earnings and savings levels are
relatively high near retirement, so the impact of punishments that allow creditors to seize the
earnings or assets of defaulters will be particularly acute at those ages. Because the e®ects of these
punishments on borrowers vary over the life cycle, credit limits will also tend to vary with age. Our
results suggest that constraints tend to be more stringent for younger individuals.
The endogeneity of credit constraints also captures the response of private markets to public
policy through changes in incentive-compatible allocations. E±cient borrowing limits will change
in response to policies that alter individual incentives to repay loans by changing their wealth levels
or returns to human capital investment. Moreover, as in Kiyotaki and Moore [33], credit constraints
depend on asset prices. To the extent that government policies are e®ective in changing investment
decisions, they are likely to have non-trivial general equilibrium e®ects. Our model incorporates
these e®ects, allowing borrowing constraints to adjust with changes in interest rates and wage rates
caused by policy intervention.
It has long been argued that the presence of borrowing constraints induces individuals with
low wealth to under-invest in human capital when human capital cannot serve as collateral for
¯nancial liabilities (see Becker [6]). In the standard economic framework, credit limits are ¯xed
and independent of the observable characteristics and decisions of individuals. Alternatively, credit
`constraints' are sometimes represented by interest rates that increase with the amount borrowed
or that exogenously vary in the population. [6, 10, 11] Based on these ideas, an empirical literature
has developed that focuses on two tests of credit constraints in the market for human capital. One
branch of the literature tests whether individuals from di®erent family income levels have di®erent
college enrollment rates conditional on ability and other variables that may in°uence tastes for
schooling or the ability to attend. [8, 9, 19, 30, 31] The second branch compares the returns to
3schooling for individuals who are expected to face di®erent interest rates or constraints on their
borrowing. [10, 11, 37]
Disagreement about the importance of credit constraints in determining schooling levels in the
U.S. abounds. Kane [30] argues that di®erences in family income are responsible for a sizeable
di®erence in college enrollment rates. However, Cameron and Heckman [8, 9] ¯nd that after con-
trolling for cognitive ability and dynamic unobserved self-selection, family income has little e®ect
on enrollment rates. This leads them to conclude that short-term borrowing constraints at the
college age are not responsible for much of the di®erence in college enrollment rates by family in-
come. Estimating a dynamic model of educational choice, Keane and Wolpin [31] ¯nd evidence of
stringent credit constraints during college years, but they estimate that relaxing those constraints
would have little e®ect on enrollment decisions. While Card [11] argues that individuals most likely
to face constraints receive higher returns to schooling (suggesting constraints do exist and prevent
constrained youth from pursuing highly productive opportunities), Cameron and Taber [10] ¯nd
little evidence of di®erential returns consistent with borrowing constraints.
In the only study that attempts to empirically estimate actual borrowing limits (albeit, in an
exogenous constraint framework), Keane and Wolpin [31] ¯nd that individuals with more human
capital can borrow more than those with fewer skills. While the empirical literature has paid
little attention to the forces underlying constraints on borrowing, our calibrated model generates
outcomes consistent with this ¯nding. The model embodies the idea that, on average, individuals
possess few physical assets at early ages when it is most e±cient to invest in human capital. They
must, therefore, borrow against future earnings if they want to invest in their skills. Even after
schooling, in the early stages of labor market participation, they may want to borrow additional
funds to smooth consumption in anticipation of higher future earnings. The degree to which
incentives to re-pay early loans line up with the needs of would-be students determines the extent of
borrowing constraints at young ages. Because more able and skilled individuals can credibly commit
to re-pay higher amounts of debt, our model produces the type of heterogeneity in constraints
estimated by Keane and Wolpin [31].
While most human capital studies with borrowing constraints assume that those constraints
are exogenously determined (e.g. Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri [1], Caucutt and Kumar, [13]
Hanushek, Yilmaz, and Leung, [23] and Loury [39]), theoretical studies of endogenous credit con-
straints have ignored issues related to human capital accumulation. Early studies were primarily
limited to implications for risk sharing and asset prices, taking household earnings to be an ex-
ogenous, and often stationary, process (e.g. Alvarez and Jermann [2], Kehoe and Levine [32], and
Kocherlakota, [34]). However, a number of more recent papers have used endogenous constraint
models to study the importance of durable goods (Krueger and Fernandez [21]) and pensions (An-
4dolfatto and Gervais [3] and Lambertini [36]) in determining life cycle consumption decisions. Also
within endogenous constraint frameworks, Krueger and Perri [35] study the e®ect of progressive
taxation on insurance markets, and Attanassio and R¶ ³os-Rull [5] explore the impact of outside
transfers on insurance for villages. None of these studies analyze the role of endogenous credit
constraints in determining human capital investment decisions{the primary focus of this paper.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our model of endoge-
nous credit constraints, as well as models with perfect credit markets and exogenous borrowing
constraints. Section 3 uses data from the U.S. to parameterize the model, and Section 4 analyt-
ically and numerically examines the e®ects of government policies on the repayment incentives of
individuals and the resulting implications for credit constraints. We contrast the implications of
our model with exogenous constraint models, examining the e®ects of alternative taxation schemes,
public schooling, and education subsidies. We discuss the existing U.S. Guaranteed Student Loan
(GSL) program and the possibility of default in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a summary
and discussion of avenues for future research.
2 The Environment
Consider a standard, in¯nite horizon, discrete time economy, populated by four-period-lived over-
lapping generations of agents. Each generation contains a continuum (with a mass of unity) of
individuals. In each period t = 0;1;2;:::, the economy is populated by young agents, two tiers of
mature agents, and old agents. In the second period of adulthood, all individuals have a single child
at which time they give them bequests, b.3 Given this timing, bequest decisions are made when
credit constraints are irrelevant; though, parents may still be tempted to default on previous loans
at this time. Within each cohort there is two-dimensional intra-generational heterogeneity. Each
young generation is composed of agents with di®erent endowments of physical assets, a, (given to
them by their parents as bequests) and di®erent endowments of learning abilities, e, which are
inherited from their parents following a Markov process described in detail below. The support of
these characteristics is A£E. The probability measure ¸ describes the endogenous distribution of
agents in this support.
Preferences at birth are given by
U0 = u(c0) + ¯u(c1) + ¯2 [u(c2) + ½v(b)] + ¯3u(c3);
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor and cj represents consumption at age j.4 The function v(¢)
3More generally, the children may be born at any earlier period, but the bulk of expenses paid for by parents are
assumed to be paid in the second period of adulthood. Without changing the results, one could instead assume that
individuals transfer bequests in the ¯nal period of life.
4We omit calendar time indices, since we focus on time invariant (stationary) equilibria.
5re°ects the utility of transferring resources to one's own child. For analytical tractability, we shall
assume that v(¢) = u(¢). The degree of \altruism" will be determined by the parameter ½ ¸ 0.
From the point of view of a young worker, a mature worker, and a retiree, preferences are given by:
U1 =u(c1) + ¯ [u(c2) + ½v(b)] + ¯2u(c3);
U2 =u(c2) + ½v(b) + ¯2u(c3);
U3 =u(c3):
Below, we assume the period utility function is given by u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ , where ¾ > 0. The typical life
cycle of all agents is described in Diagram 1.
Individuals in this economy must optimally convert physical capital into human capital, use
their human capital to produce output and earn an income, transfer resources across periods to
smooth consumption, and provide bequests to their o®spring. In the ¯rst period, agents use their
initial endowment of assets, a, to ¯nance consumption, c, and investment in human capital, y.
Human capital investment is measured in units of the only consumption/capital good and captures
not only time in school but also its quality and intensity. They may also borrow or lend. Positive d0
indicates the net debt of young agents. During the two ages of maturity, individuals work to ¯nance
current and future consumption as well as bequests to their children given in the second period
of adulthood. Their wages are proportional to their human capital, h, acquired from previous
investment and work experience. Let d1 denote the debt (d1 > 0) or savings (d1 < 0) of individuals
in the ¯rst age of maturity. Finally, let s denote the savings (always positive in equilibrium) of
individuals in the second age of maturity. When old, individuals no longer work, consuming their
savings.
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We assume that ability and investments are complementary in the production of human capital.
Speci¯cally, human capital in the ¯rst age of maturity of an agent with ability e who invested y
6units during his youth is given by
h1 = ey®;
where ® 2 (0;1) is the investment-elasticity of the human capital production function.
Individuals accumulate work experience that augments their human capital, so that human
capital at the second age of maturity is given by
h2 = Gh1 = Gey®; G > 1:
Earnings during the ¯rst and second maturity ages are given by
w1(e;y) = wh1 = wey® and w2(e;y) = wh2 = wGey®;
respectively, where w denotes the equilibrium wage per unit of human capital.
When making decisions, individuals have perfect knowledge of their ability, e, how their earnings
depend on e and y, the equilibrium price for labor, w, and the gross interest rate, R. We will assume
below that creditors also have this information.
Perfect Capital Markets
In an economy with perfect credit markets, individuals can borrow and lend freely. Implicitly, they
can fully commit to repay all debts. Regardless of initial endowments and preferences, investments
in human capital maximize the present value (discounted by R) of net earnings. Equating marginal










Consumption at each age and bequests satisfy the Euler conditions:
u0(cj) = ¯Ru0(cj+1);
u0(c2) = ½v0(b);
and the intertemporal budget constraint:
c0 + c1=R + (c2 + b)=R2 + c3=R3 = a ¡ y¤(e) + w1(e;y¤(e))[1 + G=R]=R:
Life-cycle consumption pro¯les are °at or strictly monotone, given by cj+1 = (¯R)1=¾cj. This
environment can be used as a point of reference for our main model.
7Exogenous Credit Constraints
A common assumption in the literature is that agents can borrow only up to a level ¹ dj ¸ 0, which
may depend on age j (though it rarely does in previous studies). This borrowing constraint, an
exogenous feature of the environment, is normally assumed to be the same across all individuals at
all ages.
Let V0, V1, V2 and V3 denote, respectively, the value functions of agents at the young, mature
1, mature 2, and old ages. The \state" for young agents (i.e. the argument of V0) is the pair (a;e).
Given the formulation of the problem, the arguments for V1 and V2 are respectively (w1;d0) and
(w2;d1). Finally, old agents consume all available resources, Rs, and hence V3(Rs) = u(Rs). More
explicitly, these functions satisfy:
V0(a;e) = max
fy;d0: d0·¹ d0g
fu(a + d0 ¡ y) + ¯V1(w1(e;y);d0)g;
V1(w1;d0) = max
fd1: d1·¹ d1g
fu(w1 + d1 ¡ Rd0) + ¯V2(Gw1;d1)g;
V2(w2;d1) = max
fsg
fu(w2 ¡ Rd1 ¡ b ¡ s) + ½v(b) + ¯u(Rs)g:
If initial wealth is low enough, an individual will under-invest in human capital due to the
exogenous borrowing constraint. Among those who are constrained, investments will be strictly
increasing in initial assets. Notice, however, that investments will not generally increase one-for-
one with increases in the amount of borrowing allowed, since individuals will also want to increase
their current consumption. This model is consistent with inverted-U shaped life cycle consumption
pro¯les if ¯R < 1.
Endogenous Credit Constraints
The primary focus of this paper is to study an environment in which credit constraints arise
endogenously from incentive problems. In this environment, constraints on borrowing will di®er
across individuals and over the life cycle.
The main insight of the endogenous constraint model is that institutional frameworks protect,
albeit imperfectly, the rights of creditors. Institutions often allow creditors to discipline defaulting
borrowers by impeding future borrowing, destroying their credit rating, garnishing a fraction of
their earnings, and seizing part of their owned assets (currently and in a pre-speci¯ed future). We
attempt to capture these forces in an admittedly stylized way.
For tractability, assume that defaulting agents are excluded from further borrowing and any
savings earn a lower rate of return Rd = ÁR, Á 2 (0;1). The latter punishment captures a number
8of e®ects. For example, if creditors can seize all savings deposited in formal markets, individuals will
be forced to save in informal sectors or use a `backyard' technology o®ering a lower rate of return.
Alternatively, creditors may be able to seize a fraction of all physical assets saved by defaulting
agents as re°ected in Chapter 7 bankruptcy ¯lings. We also assume that individuals must forfeit
a fraction ° 2 (0;1) of their earnings if they choose to default. Wage earnings can be garnished
up to 10% (15% for federal employees) for those who default on federal student loans. Tax refunds
can also be seized.5 More generally, individuals with positive income but zero assets will typically
be required to re-pay some of their loan, where that re-payment is likely to depend on their level
of income. And, because defaulting borrowers receive a bad credit rating, they face di±culties in
borrowing to purchase a home and are typically forced to rent instead. Given the sizeable tax
breaks provided for home mortgages, this implies that lucrative tax breaks must be foregone by
those who default. Poor credit ratings may also make renting more costly for those who default as
property owners may be reluctant to rent to them. To the extent that these costs are positively
related to earnings, they are re°ected in °. Overall, these punishment parameters (Á;°) should be
viewed as approximations to a more complex system that relates punishments to the income and
savings of individuals choosing to default. We assume that all of these punishments apply for only
one period.
Clearly, the relevance of these three di®erent punishments varies across the life cycle of agents.
Being shut out of the lending market may be extremely costly for young workers who wish to borrow
against higher future earnings. Yet, it has little impact on those about to retire. On the contrary,
older workers earn higher incomes and hold more assets. For them, the ability of creditors to seize
their assets or income if they default can be quite costly. These costs are likely to be smaller for
the young worker just out of college.
Creditors foresee the repayment incentives of agents. Therefore, they will only lend up to
the maximum amount a borrower will willingly repay. Credit limits should incorporate all the
(observable) information of borrowers, which (in this framework) includes their wealth, age, ability,
and any human capital investments. As a result, agents with di®erent characteristics will face
di®erent credit limits. Furthermore, individuals can a®ect the amount of credit they receive by
choosing to invest more or less in their human capital. Borrowing limits should, therefore, be
viewed as functions of age, ability, and investments rather than ¯xed constants. Because of this,
any change in the environment that alters the costs or returns of physical and human capital
investment will induce a change in the credit limits faced by everyone.
5Student loans receive special treatment in bankruptcy proceedings. In general, they cannot be discharged under
Chapter 7 bankruptcy and they must be paid in full under Chapter 13 bankruptcy re-payment plans except under
extreme circumstances. Simple failure to make student loan payments, or default, can result in wage garnishments,
seizure of tax refunds, and a poor credit rating.
9Given preferences, demographics, technologies and the institutional environment (°;Á), it is
possible that unrestricted consumption and investment decisions are not incentive compatible for
some agents. Credit constraints bind when the unrestricted plan entails levels of debt that are
so high that the agent is better o® defaulting and enduring the associated punishment. Rational
creditors with full information will restrict the amount of credit so that the agent never chooses to
default. As a result, the expected discounted utility of repaying one's debt will always be equal to
or better than the one attainable by defaulting. With perfect information and without uncertainty,
there will be no default in equilibrium.
Letting V d
1 and V d
2 be the value functions obtainable by defaulting in the two maturity periods,








fu(w1 + d1 ¡ Rd0) + ¯V2(Gw1;d1)g; (1)
V2(w2;d1) = max
fs;bg
fu(w2 ¡ b ¡ Rd1 ¡ s) + ½v(b) + ¯u(Rs)g;
where
V d
1 (w1) = max
fd1: d1·0g
fu(w1(1 ¡ °) + d1) + ¯V2(Gw1;Rdd1)g; and (2)
V d
2 (w2) = max
fs;bg
fu(w2(1 ¡ °) ¡ b ¡ s) + ½v(b) + ¯u(Rds)g:
Diagram 2 displays the possible life cycle investment/consumption plans. The £ s indicate that
the market will block any investment plan that triggers default.
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Depending on initial wealth and ability, credit limits may bind during youth (the ¯rst period).
In subsequent periods, the decisions made in previous periods will determine whether constraints
bind. Agents in the ¯rst period of maturity with positive debt would typically want to roll-over
some of their debt to smooth consumption across their adult life. However, if the debt becomes too
high, the amount needed to borrow for the unrestricted consumption plan could trigger default in
the second period of maturity. Finally, the presence of retirement (old age) causes agents to save
(rather than borrow) during their second period of maturity. Credit constraints are not relevant
at that age, so default incentives in old age can be ignored. In summary, loans made during youth
and the ¯rst age of maturity need to be compatible with individual incentives to default during the
¯rst and second periods of maturity. Constraint levels may change between youth and maturity
due to changes in incentives to default.
The thick lines in Diagram 2 indicate the only three possible paths in equilibrium. Individuals
that are unconstrained during their youth will remain unconstrained throughout the rest of their
lives.6 Intuitively, if a young individual knew he would be constrained the next period, he would
borrow and consume less while young. He would continue to reduce his current consumption
until either the future constraint was no longer binding or until his current borrowing became
6To see why, assume that to the contrary, an agent is unconstrained when young but that he is constrained later
in life. Because he is not constrained during his youth, his investment y must equal the unconstrained optimum.
Thus, the binding constraints only distort consumption. In the second period of maturity, the agent cannot be credit
constrained as he wants to save. Therefore, the only possibility is that he is constrained in the ¯rst period of maturity,
i.e. u
0(c1) > ¯Ru
0(c2), since he is unconstrained during his youth, i.e. u
0(c0) = ¯Ru




0(c2), which is a contradiction implying that the agent was constrained during the ¯rst two
periods of life.
11constrained. On the other hand, individuals that are constrained in their youth may or may not
remain constrained in the ¯rst period of maturity.
For any given pair (w;R) ¯xed, the model can be solved almost entirely in closed form. Regions
of (w;R) in which individuals default will never be reached in equilibrium. Still, to solve the model
and obtain an expression for the credit constraints, it is necessary to obtain the value functions
and the value of default for all nodes of the tree in Diagram 2.
Constraints will be non-binding in the second period of maturity as individuals save for re-






1¡¾ if d1 > ¹w2 (the agent defaults)
£½(R)
[w2¡Rd1]1¡¾
1¡¾ if d1 · ¹w2 (the agent re-pays),










if ½ > 0
£0(R) if ½ = 0












This function is obtained from calculating the optimal retirement savings and bequest decisions
of individuals in the second period of maturity. If the agent carried over a large debt relative to
his wage earnings, it could be optimal to default on it. In such a case, there are two costs of
not repaying the debt. He loses a fraction of his earnings and earns a lower rate of return on his
savings. At this age, the restriction on future borrowing is irrelevant. The function ¹ that de¯nes













The level of debt that triggers default is a constant fraction of current earning levels. This
fraction is given by ¹ = ¹(R), which is a strictly decreasing function of the gross interest rate R.
This fraction is also increasing in the punishments creditors can impose on those who default (i.e.
¹ is increasing in ° and decreasing in Á). Because creditors foresee optimal default decisions, the
function ¹ also de¯nes the credit constraints, i.e. the limits of the net debt that agents in the ¯rst
period of maturity can carry over for the second period of maturity. With perfect information,
7Here, we ignore the case of a very generous pay-as-you-go pension system, in which poor agents could wish to
borrow even in the second period of maturity.
12lenders will never allow the debt of young workers to exceed ¹w2 in this environment. While ¹
only depends on interest rates, punishment parameters ° and Á, and preferences, borrowing limits
depend on investments and ability through future earnings, w2. To the extent that earnings are
increasing in y and e, so will the amount of borrowing that is allowed.
We can also obtain the amount of bequest transferred by a parent. If W2(e;a) denotes the net
wealth of a mature worker who started life with (e;a), then his child will start life with an initial







With these results, the value function for the ¯rst period of maturity can be determined ana-
lytically. Assume that the ratio G=(1 ¡ °) is high enough with respect to ¯ÁR so that defaulting
agents in the ¯rst period of maturity will not want to save. Then, agents that default in the ¯rst
period of maturity will simply consume their current earnings, net of the seized portion.8
Characterizing the value function and the optimal decisions in this period is more complex.
In addition to determining whether or not an individual defaults on his current debts, it is also
necessary to determine whether he is able to accumulate further debts as freely as optimization
requires. Borrowing may be restricted from future default incentives, as indicated by ¹.
Depending on the \state" (w1;d0) at the ¯rst age of maturity, the individual will either default
on earlier loans (in which case he cannot borrow again), face a constraint on additional borrowing,
or make unconstrained choices. The levels of debt that de¯ne each of these regions can be expressed











1¡¾ if ·0w1 < d0 · ·1w1 (the agent is constrained)
w1¡¾
1
1¡¾ [(1 ¡ °)1¡¾ + ¯£½(R)G1¡¾] if d0 > ·1w1 (the agent defaults)
8Considering the possibility that defaulting agents want to save does not add much complexity but also does not











1 + (¯R)(1=¾)(1 + ½¡1=¾)=R + (¯R)(2=¾)=R2¤1¡¾
·0(¹;R) =
¹G(1 + (¯£½(R)R)¡1=¾R) + 1 ¡ (¯£½(R)R)¡1=¾G
R
·1(¹;R) =
1 + ¹G ¡
£





In the ¯rst region for d0, debt carried over from youth is relatively low (d0 · ·0w1) such
that re-payment is preferred to default. Furthermore, the agent is not constrained from borrowing
additional funds during his ¯rst period of work. From that date onwards, he is able to ¯nance the
unrestricted consumption pro¯le. At the other extreme, if debt left over from youth is high enough
(d0 > ·1w1), the individual is better o® defaulting and enduring punishment from lenders. In
equilibrium, lenders will recognize this and restrict debts to be no greater than ·1w1 during youth.
For mid-level initial debts (d0 2 (·0w1;·1w1]), young workers do not owe enough to make default
worthwhile, however, they are constrained from carrying a debt of more than ¹w2 into the second
period of maturity because of future incentives to default. In this case, the end of period net debt
for the worker will be the maximum allowed (d1 = ¹w2). In equilibrium, debts during youth are
limited to d0 · ·1w1, while debts during the ¯rst period of work are constrained to d1 · ¹w2. The
factor ·0 simply characterizes the level of ¯rst period debt above which individuals want to borrow
more in the second period than will be allowed by lenders.
The rate of growth in earnings, G, plays an important role in determining whether individuals
will be constrained from borrowing during their ¯rst age of maturity. Given (w1;d0), individuals
that experience substantial wage growth will want to borrow a lot during their youth and the ¯rst
age of maturity to smooth consumption. On the other hand, those with high wage growth will face
a greater penalty from default { the inability to borrow again is costly since they can no longer
smooth consumption and wage garnishments will be greater. These individuals are, therefore,
allowed to borrow more than those with less wage growth. Whether or not they are more likely
to face binding constraints depends on the balance of these two forces { their greater demand for
credit and their greater incentives to re-pay their loans.
Credit constraints will only bind in the ¯rst two periods of life, since agents want to save
and not borrow in the period prior to retirement. Thus, there are only three possibilities for the
9The function ±(R) derives directly from unrestricted optimization. Then, the unrestricted borrowing function,
d1(d0;w1), can be calculated. ·0 is obtained by solving the equality ¹Gw1 = d1(d0;w1), i.e. the maximum level of
debt d0 that is consistent with the credit constraint not binding in that period. Finally, to obtain the value of ·1,
















1¡¾ for all (w1;d0).
14constraints: (i) the credit constraints bind for the ¯rst two periods, (ii) they bind for only the ¯rst
period, or (iii) they never bind. However, due to the uniformity of preferences, only one of the ¯rst
two possibilities can arise in any given equilibrium { it is not possible that, in the same stationary
equilibrium, some agents are constrained for only one period, while others are constrained for two.
There are two types of equilibria in which at least some individuals are constrained. A Type
I equilibrium consists of a group of agents for whom the credit constraints bind in the ¯rst two
periods and another group (which may not exist) that is always unconstrained. In this equilibrium,
·0 < ·1 and individuals who are constrained during their youth will continue to be constrained
during their ¯rst period of maturity. The borrowing constraints are de¯ned by d0 · ·1w1 during
youth and by d1 · ¹w2 during the ¯rst period of work. A Type II equilibrium consists of one
group that is only constrained during the ¯rst period and another group (which may not exist)
that is always unconstrained. In this equilibrium, some youth are constrained to borrow no more
than ·1w1, while all workers are able to borrow freely. Individuals that were constrained during
their youth are unconstrained in later periods either because the borrowing constraints they faced
initially were very stringent or because constraints during adulthood are quite loose.
The conditions determining which of these two possible types of equilibria arise depends on the
interest rate (as we illustrate below). That is, whether or not the inequality ·0 < ·1 holds depends
on R. Both ·1 and ¹ are decreasing with respect to the interest rate. A higher interest rate increases
the amount the agent has to repay and, therefore, less debt is needed to trigger default. The factor
·0 may be increasing or decreasing in R. It captures two e®ects. On the one hand, the lower the
interest rate, the more interested a young worker will be in borrowing. Thus, the punishment of
not being allowed to borrow will be more costly. This increases the maximum debt required for
the constraint ¹ to bind. On the other hand, the lower the interest rate, the lower the e®ective
liability of the agent, which makes it more attractive to re-pay any debts. Numerical simulations
can produce cases in which either e®ect dominates. If the punishment of not being able to borrow
is so costly that individuals are willing to relinquish resources for the opportunity to increase their
consumption smoothing, then ·0 will be negative and a Type I equilibrium is guaranteed.
General Equilibrium
We now make explicit the set E of di®erent ability types as well as the intergenerational transmission
of ability.
A. 1. The support of abilities is given by a ¯nite set E ½ R+.
Let E be the power set of E. The transmission of abilities from parents to children is given by
the transition function P : E £ E ! [0;1].
15A stationary economy is one in which a time-invariant probability space describes the population
at each point in time. Given the structure of the model, the economy is stationary if and only if
there is a time invariant distribution for (a;e) among youth. Since bequests are non-negative, the
set of possible initial asset levels is contained in A ½ R+. Let B+ denote the Borel sets R+ and A
denote the Borel sets on A. Finally, let F be the product space E £ A. For a measure ¸ de¯ned
over the space (E £ A;F) to be invariant, it is required that, given the bequest function b(e;a), ¸




Âf(e0;b(e;a))2Bg(e;a)P(e0;e)¸(de £ da): (Agg1)
where Â is the indicator function.
Given ¸, aggregate human capital H is given by
H = (1 + G)
Z
E£A
ey(a;e)®¸(da £ de): (Agg2)




[s(a;e) ¡ d0(a;e) ¡ d1(a;e)]¸(da £ de): (Agg3)
Aggregate output, Q, is produced with physical and human capital according to the production
function Q = F(K;H), where F(K;H) is increasing and concave in both K and H.
Regardless of the contracting environment, aggregate human and physical capital determine the








where ± 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
All the above leads to the following standard de¯nition:
De¯nition 1. Stationary Equilibrium Given the demographics fE £ A;F;Pg, preferences
fu(¢);v(¢);¯;½g, technologies fey®;F(¢;¢);±g, and the credit market contracting environment (°;Á),
a stationary equilibrium is a price pair fw;Rg, an invariant distribution ¸, aggregate capital stocks
fH;Kg and individual allocations fy(a;e);d0(a;e);d1(a;e);s(a;e)g such that
1. Given fw;Rg, the allocation fy(a;e);d0(a;e);d1(a;e);b(a;e);s(a;e)g solves the individual problem for
all (a;e) 2 A £ E;
2. The aggregate stocks are consistent with individual decisions (equations Agg1, Agg2 and Agg3); and,
3. Prices clear the markets (equations MC).
Because of their importance in the actual U.S. economy, we include government policies like
public schooling and education subsidies in our calibration of the model. Their inclusion a®ects
the decisions and constraints of all agents. It also requires the inclusion of a government budget
constraint in the de¯nition of a stationary equilibrium. These changes are straightforward and
discussed further in the next section of the paper.
163 Parameterizing the Model
To quantitatively assess the e®ect of government policies we need to specify empirically grounded
parameter values for preferences, intergenerational transmission of ability, technologies, and credit
institutions. We parameterize the model using data from the U.S. economy. In particular, we use
data on schooling, ability, and wages in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and
schooling costs from the Digest of Education Statistics [41]. We also generate life cycle consumption
patterns that are consistent with the patterns estimated in the literature (e.g. Carroll and Summers
[12] and Attanasio, et al. [4]).
In our set up, a period is interpreted as approximately 15 years. Using a yearly discount factor
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Our base case assumes complementarity between physical and human capital with r = 0:2.10 An
annual depreciation rate of 8% is assumed for physical capital, so ± = 1¡0:9215. These parameters
are reported in Table 1. All other parameters of the model are determined using the data and
procedures described in the following subsections.
Table 1: Assumed Parameter Values in the Base Model
Parameter Base Case Value
¯ 1:06¡15
± 1 ¡ 0:9215
r 0.2
3.1 Determining Parameters for Wage Growth and Human Capital Production
We empirically estimate the parameters ®, G, and the distribution of e using wage and earnings
data for men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and average direct schooling
expenditures per pupil from the Digest of Education Statistics. [41] The NLSY is particularly useful
for our purposes, since it contains often used measures of cognitive ability in the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test (AFQT), and it follows the same individuals over the early part (¯rst 17 years)
of their careers. To aid in estimation of heterogeneous learning abilities, we categorize individuals
in the NLSY into ¯ve ability groups (corresponding to each of the ¯ve quintiles in the national
distribution) according to their scores on the AFQT.
10We have also explored a version with r = ¡0:2 in which human and physical capital are substitutes in production.
Tables analogous to those presented below show very little substantive di®erence.
17A two-step procedure is used to estimate the parameters of interest. First, total costs for each
year of schooling are computed from direct expenditures and foregone earnings. Then, a log wage
regression is used to estimate human capital parameters of the model.
In calculating direct expenditures, we use average expenditures per pupil from 1980-89 for
primary and secondary schooling, and for universities and colleges, since those years correspond to
the years most men in our NLSY sample made their marginal schooling decisions.11 See Appendix
Table A-1 for the present value of direct expenditures for each year of schooling.12 In 1999 dollars,
direct costs for 12 years of schooling amount to almost $60,000, and expenditures for 16 years of
schooling cost about $100,000. While a substantial fraction of these direct costs are subsidized by
the government, they still re°ect direct inputs. We include them here because the objective at this
moment is to estimate the human capital production function.
Working men in the NLSY are used to compute foregone earnings. We use a standard log
earnings regression that controls for experience (age - education - 6), experience-squared, and
indicators for each AFQT quintile to compute average annual earnings for men of all schooling
and ability combinations. Foregone earnings are set to zero for those with 9 years of schooling
under the assumption that individuals generally cannot work before age 14 in most states. For
individuals with more than 9 years of schooling, foregone earnings are computed as the earnings
for someone with 9 years of schooling (appropriately adjusted each year for experience that would
have been acquired) had they chosen to work rather than attend school each year thereafter. Unlike
direct expenditures, foregone earnings are speci¯c to the ability group. Not surprisingly, more able
individuals forego more earnings for each year of school they attend. The sum of foregone earnings
and direct expenditures for each year of schooling are given by AFQT quintile in Table A-1. For
someone in the highest ability quintile, total expenditures on schooling for a college graduate are
approximately $136,000.
In step two, we use wage data in the NLSY to estimate ®, G, and ability levels e for each of
the ¯ve types, recognizing that our model produces the following wage relationships:
log(w1) = log(w) + log(e) + ®log(y)
log(w2) = log(w) + log(e) + ®log(y) + log(G):
This simple speci¯cation motivates the following log wage regression:
log(wage) = a + ®log(y) +
5 X
j=2
´jAFQTj + °1X + °2X2 + " (3)
11Direct expenditures for individuals attending school for twelve or fewer years are simply the present value of annual
primary/secondary expenditures for the appropriate number of school years. For those attending 13 or more years
of school, direct expenditures include 12 years of primary/secondary expenditures plus college tuition expenditures.
12Consistent with our equilibrium calibration, a 4% interest rate was assumed in calculating the present value of
all costs. Costs are discounted back to the time of school entry.
18where y is taken from total expenditures on schooling for the appropriate schooling-ability clas-
si¯cation in Table A-1, AFQTj represents an indicator for AFQT quintile j, and X represents
work experience (de¯ned as age - education - 6). This wage regression maintains the assumption
that ability, the logarithm of education expenditures, and experience (incorporated in G in our
simpli¯ed model) should enter a log wage equation linearly.13
The point estimate for ® is 0:6146. It directly corresponds to the parameter of interest { the
elasticity of human capital with respect to investments { and is used in our simulations below.
Since it is impossible to distinguish between log(w) and log(e1), one must normalize either the
price of skills or the lowest ability level. Normalizing e1 = 1, estimates for higher ability learning
levels are given by ej = exp(´j).
Finally, the returns to experience given by °1 and °2 can be used to determine G. Because
log earnings are quadratic in experience, any estimate of G will depend on how we de¯ne the two
work periods of the model. Since we are interested in studying borrowing and savings behavior for
individuals in school and recently out of school, we compute G using the ratio of wages for someone
with 15 years of experience relative to zero years of experience yielding a value of 2:1275 for G.
These parameter estimates are summarized in Table 2.









Estimates for ej provide a measure of the quantitative e®ect of ability on earnings. Someone
from the highest ability group will earn 39% more than someone from the lowest ability group
conditional on the same human capital investment.
3.2 Intergenerational Transmission of Ability
The estimates of ej indicate the earnings capacity for agents in di®erent quintiles of cognitive ability.
By construction, each of these ability types has a 20% mass, which we take to be the stationary
distribution for ability. The intergenerational transmission of ability is assumed to be a ¯ve-point
13See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd [27] for an empirical discussion of these assumptions over the second half of
the 20th Century.
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We choose ¼ = 0:1763 to generate an intergenerational correlation of ability equal to 0.5. See
Daniels, et al., [14] for a recent discussion of these estimates. The results we focus on are quite
robust to changes in the speci¯cation for P or the values for ¼ that we use.
3.3 Calibrating Altruism, Credit Market Punishments, and Aggregate Tech-
nology Parameters
We choose the parameters ½, °, Á, A, and », such that the stationary equilibrium in the economy
mimics main features of the U.S. economy. Features we replicate include an equilibrium real
interest rate of R = 1:0415, average wage earnings of young workers, E(w1), average expenditures
on education, E(y), and average consumption growth over the life cycle (E(c1)=E(c0), E(c2)=E(c1),
and E(c3)=E(c2)). Mean wages are calculated using the log wage regression estimates from the
NLSY data described above to remove any in°uences of di®erential cohort size. We compute a
mean wage income for the ¯rst 15 years of work to be $247,145. Using the empirical distribution for
schooling by ability and the expenditures reported in Table A-1, we compute the mean investment
in the NLSY to be approximately $92,673. In our calibration, we divide these amounts by 1,000
to normalize units in thousands of dollars. We replicate average consumption growth rates of
E(c1)=E(c0) = 2:5, E(c2)=E(c1) = 1:15, and E(c3)=E(c2) = 0:8, which roughly correspond to the
patterns reported in Carroll and Summers [12] and Attanasio, et al. [4].14
Given the considerable public involvement in the U.S. educational system, we introduce a sub-
sidy schedule for human capital investment in our calibration. Investments are assumed to be
subsidized fully through y0 = 50 (roughly grade 10), after which they are subsidized at the rate
º = 0:5 (re°ecting the fact that foregone earnings are a sizeable fraction of schooling costs once
individuals are old enough to work but that the government also signi¯cantly subsidizes the direct
costs of high school and college). Flat wage taxes are levied to balance the federal budget (i.e. to
pay for the subsidies to investment). See the following section for a more complete discussion of
how this policy environment a®ects the constraint functions.
The calibrated parameters are shown in Table 3 along with the data target values.15 The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ¾, can be directly determined from ¯, the desired interest
14These (and other) studies report estimated life cycle pro¯les for consumption that di®er considerably. The
consumption growth factors we use lie within the range of estimates produced by these studies.
15We verify that the steady state is unique within a region around these parameter values.
20rate, and the ratio of expected consumption E(c3)=E(c2). There is no simple mapping between any
of the other parameters and the data targets within each column, as the parameter values needed
can only be obtained by solving for the stationary equilibrium repeatedly until all ¯ve of those
target values are matched.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values and Target Data (Base Case)
Parameter Value Target Data
¾ 1.2804 ¾ = log(¯R)=log(E(c3)=E(c2)), E(c3)=E(c2) = 0:8
½ 0.2286 E(y) = 93
A 13.593 E(w1) = 247
» 0.0664 R = 1:0415 = 1:80
° 0.1285 E(c1)=E(c0) = 2:5
Á 0.9834 E(c2)=E(c1) = 1:15
The calibration implies that individuals who default face costs equal to 13% of their earnings
and 2% of their savings. These cost factors correspond well to o±cial policies toward individuals
who default on federal student loans, which specify that wage earnings can be garnished up to 10%
(15% for federal employees). The role of assets in determining punishments for those defaulting on
student loans is less clear from a legal standpoint, re°ecting the fact that most recent graduates
have little or no assets to seize. As we show below, the equilibrium is quite insensitive to changes
in Á.
3.4 The Base Case Economy
This section describes important characteristics of the calibrated base economy. Equilibrium inter-
est rates and skill prices are presented in Table 4 along with aggregate human and physical capital
levels, the wage tax rate, and the average educational subsidy amount. A wage tax rate of 9.23%
is needed to pay for education subsidies, which average $71 per person.








Figure 1 displays the stationary distribution of initial assets in equilibrium by ability. Because
ability is correlated across generations, more able individuals tend to receive larger bequests from
21Figure 1: Distribution of Initial Assets by Ability


























their parents, who were also likely to have been more able. While most lower ability individuals
begin with assets of less than $70, most high ability individuals begin with assets above that
amount. The distribution of initial assets is summarized in column 1 of Table 5. The di®erence in
average initial assets for the most able and least able is about $17.
Table 5: Base Case Initial Assets, Investment, Earnings, Debt, and Consumption
Statistic a y w1 d0 d1 c0 c1 c2
E(¢) 74 93 247 30 35 83 206 235
E(¢je1) 64 77 176 21 25 71 147 168
E(¢je2) 71 89 235 28 33 80 196 224
E(¢je3) 76 96 263 32 37 85 219 251
E(¢je4) 78 98 269 32 38 87 224 256
E(¢je5) 81 103 293 35 42 90 244 279
V ar(¢) 162 153 1,796 26 36 114 1,247 1,628
E(V ar(¢je)) 125 74 198 3 4 73 138 180
Figure 2 shows how human capital investments increase with ability and initial assets. For any
given level of initial assets, the least able individuals invest about $5 less than the second lowest
ability group and about $10 less than the most able. The a®ects of ability on investment appear
to be fairly constant across initial asset levels. For every $1 increase in initial assets, investment
tends to increase by nearly $.80 for all ability groups.
The overall distribution of investment in the economy depends on the joint distribution of
initial assets and ability. The positive correlation between ability and initial assets results in
much higher investment among the more able, as seen in Figure 3, which graphs the conditional
distribution of investment for each ability type. As Table 5 shows, average investment di®erences
by ability (column 2) are substantial. This is also clearly re°ected in Figure 3, which shows that
22Figure 2: Human Capital Investment as a Function of Ability and Initial Assets


































Figure 3: Distribution of Human Capital Investment by Ability


























the distributions of investment for the lowest and highest ability groups barely overlap. Much of
the investment di®erence is due to the correlation between ability and initial assets. Recall that
Figure 2 implies that, conditional on initial assets, the di®erence in investment between the least
and most able should be about $10. This re°ects the direct e®ect of ability through it's e®ect on
the marginal returns to investment (and the ability to borrow as we discuss more below). The
$26 average di®erence in investment between the most and least able individuals reported in Table
5 re°ects this direct relationship as well as the fact that more able individuals also tend to have
higher initial assets.
Table 5 reports a number of other interesting statistics for the economy. For example, column 3
reports average earnings in the population, average earnings conditional on ability, the variance in
earnings in the population, and the average conditional variance (i.e. the average of each variance
23Figure 4: Debt for Youth (d0) as a Function of Ability and Initial Assets



























conditional on ability) for individuals during the ¯rst period of work. Di®erences in earnings across
ability types re°ect both di®erences in investment and di®erences in the return to investment.
Thus, more able individuals earn substantially more than their less able counterparts.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 report the same statistics on debt for youth and young workers.
In equilibrium, all youth and young workers are constrained, so the entries in the table re°ect the
amount of borrowing allowed. On average, youth are able to borrow up to $30 and young workers
$35, but there is considerable variation related to initial asset levels and ability as shown in Figures
4 and 5. Allowable debt increases in initial assets (by about $1 for every $6 increase in assets),
because individuals with higher initial assets will invest more in their human capital. This is also
true for ability; however, allowable debt would also increase with ability if investment were held
constant since more able individuals will earn higher returns on their investments. Holding initial
assets constant, the most able can borrow about $10-15 more than the least able during their youth
and ¯rst period of work { these di®erences are sizeable given the relatively low levels of average
debt. Thus, more able individuals not only have an advantage in that they can produce more
human capital for any given investment, but they also tend to begin life with higher initial assets
and greater access to credit.
The maximum allowable debt depends on future earnings power relative to the factors ·1 and
¹, which are reported in Table 6 along with ·0. Notice that ·0 < 0, which implies that the economy
is in a Type I equilibrium { constraints bind during youth and the ¯rst period of work. Creditors
will allow debt during youth to reach 13.2% of (after-tax) earnings next period, and they will allow
young workers to borrow up to 7.3% of their (after-tax) earnings the following period.
As discussed earlier, these constraint factors depend on the equilibrium interest rate. Figure
6 shows this relationship for R corresponding to annual interest rates ranging from 2-6%. Since
24Figure 5: Debt for Young Workers (d1) as a Function of Ability and Initial Assets








































¹ < G over the entire range of R, the ¯gure suggests that individuals will
generally be allowed to borrow more during the ¯rst period of work than during their youth. The
fraction of future earnings that youth can borrow tends to be more responsive to changes in interest
rates, so we might expect greater general equilibrium e®ects on borrowing at this time than during
the ¯rst period of work.
Finally, we can examine consumption in the economy. The ¯nal three columns of Table 5 report
summary statistics on consumption for the ¯rst three periods (note that c3 = 0:8c2 for everyone).
Figure 6: Dependence of Solvency Constraints on the Interest Rate



















































25Figure 7: Lifecycle Consumption Pro¯les for Individuals with Initial Assets of $75

































Consumption increases substantially (by a factor of 2.5, on average) from youth to the ¯rst period
of work. This is by design, since we calibrate the economy to produce this increase. As shown in the
table, the increase is substantially greater (in percentage terms as well as levels) for the more able
types. This is largely because more able individuals earn a higher return on their investments and
are, therefore, willing to give up more consumption in the short run to ¯nance those investments.
Figure 7 graphs some representative consumption pro¯les for individuals with identical initial assets
(a = 75) but who di®er in ability. While consumption varies very little by ability for youth with
the same level of initial assets, there are sizeable di®erences in consumption among workers and
retirees.
4 Government Policies
A wide variety of government policies present in actual economies are likely to a®ect human capital
accumulation and consumption/savings decisions. Some of these policies are institutionalized with
the explicit aim to foster human capital. Others are not, though they are likely to a®ect the life cycle
decisions of individuals.16 Each of these policies have been the subject of extensive research. Our
contribution is to investigate them explicitly recognizing the response of private ¯nancial markets.
In an e±cient credit market, government policies will a®ect investment through three channels.
First, they may directly alter the costs and bene¯ts of investment. Second, they may alter borrowing
limits placed on individuals. Finally, general equilibrium changes in the price of human capital and
interest rates will a®ect investment through changes in the costs and bene¯ts of investment as well
as the amount of lending creditors will provide. We analyze all three of these channels.
16See Heckman, Lochner, Smith, and Taber [25] for a discussion of government policy and human capital formation.
264.1 Bankruptcy Policy
First, we investigate the e®ects of changing the bankruptcy code and its enforcement. In our model,
this can take the form of changes in the parameters (Á;°). Given (w;R), tougher punishments on
default increase the feasible credit for each agent. Unconstrained agents will not change their
plans, while constrained agents, facing stricter punishments, can commit to increased borrowing
and investment allowing greater human capital investment and smoother consumption pro¯les.
Thus, as long as w and R remain unchanged, all individuals will be better o®.
Figures 8 and 9 show the equilibrium constraint factors (¹;·0;·1) as functions of Á and ° given
R. As the amount of earnings and savings that can be seized increase, individuals can borrow a
greater fraction of their future earnings. This increase is much greater during the schooling period
than the ¯rst period of work when ° is increased. As a result, increases in the amount of earnings
that can be seized will greatly enhance borrowing opportunities among youth in school. On the
other hand, increases in the amount of savings that can be seized (represented by an increase in
Á) has a greater impact on the borrowing constraints of young workers. Overall, the amount of
earnings that can be seized appears to play a much more important role in determining borrowing
constraints. Completely eliminating the ability of creditors to seize any saved assets (i.e. setting
Á = 1) would not eliminate borrowing, whereas eliminating the ability of creditors to seize earnings
would.
Figure 8: Response of Constraints to Changes in Á












1 and m with R=1.809 and g=0.1285
































Figure 9: Response of Constraints to Changes in °











1 and m with R=1.809 and f=0.9834
































In general equilibrium, this is not necessarily true. Changes in human capital investment
27decisions will a®ect interest rates and the equilibrium price of human capital, which also determine
borrowing constraints. We numerically analyze the impacts of increasing punishments imposed on
those who default in both partial and general equilibrium. Table 7 reports the impacts of increasing
the amount of earnings that can be seized by creditors to ° = 0:15. It also shows the impacts of
reducing the rate of return on savings to Á = 0:95. Both changes give creditors more power to
punish borrowers, so that constraints should loosen given w and R. This is indeed the case as seen
from the partial equilibrium responses in the constraint functions ¹ and ·1 and average levels of
debt.
We begin with a discussion of changes in °. Holding interest rates constant, human capital
investment increases substantially in response to a rise in ° due to the greater availability of credit.
This results in higher wages and aggregate levels of human capital. But, the large increase in
human capital and decline in physical capital suggests that the price of human capital is likely
to decline while interest rates increase once general equilibrium e®ects are accounted for. This is
con¯rmed in column 3. The increase in interest rates has only modest e®ects on ¹, consistent with
Figure 6. Overall, individuals can borrow more during their ¯rst period of work for any given level
of future (after-tax) earnings. In contrast, the increase in R has substantial e®ects on ·1, causing
the new equilibrium value to be lower than in the base case economy. Because ·1 determines
the amount of debt youth can take on, its decline causes investment in human capital to decline,
thereby reducing subsequent earnings. The reduction in investment also lowers wages in the second
period of adulthood, which causes the actual amount of debt young workers can incur to decline
even though ·1 increases. Overall, an increase in ° from the base case value reduces human capital
investment, earnings, and consumption once general equilibrium factors are considered.
The ¯nal two columns of Table 7 show the impacts of reducing Á to 0.95, in which case individ-
uals who default can only retain 95% of the assets they save. As expected, ·1 and ¹ increase when
R is held ¯xed. But, as with the increase in °, the indirect e®ects of an increase in R more than
o®set the direct e®ect on ·1 in general equilibrium. After incorporating price changes, the average
amount of debt decreases slightly among youth and young workers, as does investment in human
capital. Earnings and consumption also decline at all ages.
These policy experiments highlight the importance of considering general equilibrium impacts
when analyzing changes in bankruptcy policy. A partial equilibrium analysis suggests that increases
in the punishments creditors can impose on individuals who default should increase allowable
debt, human capital investment, earnings, and consumption. While this is generally true when
punishment levels are very low (e.g. increasing ° from zero or reducing Á from one), it may not be
true at current punishment levels. Based on our calibrated economy, we ¯nd that allowable debt,
investment, earnings, and consumption all decline in response to strengthened default punishments
28Table 7: Increased Punishments
° = 0:15 Á = 0:95
Base Case Partial General Partial General
Variable (° = 0:1285, Á = 0:9834) Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
w 12.2102 12.2102 12.0646 12.2102 12.1690
R 1.8009 1.8009 2.0492 1.8009 1.8678
¿ 0.0923 0.0929 0.0932 0.0923 0.0925
·0 -0.0860 -0.0541 -0.0025 -0.0747 -0.0571
·1 0.1323 0.1546 0.1287 0.1356 0.1287
¹ 0.0734 0.0853 0.0749 0.0776 0.0748
H 63 69 61 64 62
K 40 29 33 37 37
E(subsidy) 71 78 68 72 70
E(y) 93 107 87 94 89
E(y(e1)) 77 87 73 78 75
E(y(e2)) 89 102 84 91 86
E(y(e3)) 96 111 90 98 92
E(y(e4)) 98 113 92 100 94
E(y(e5)) 103 120 96 105 99
V (y) 153 225 128 161 136
E(V (yje)) 74 98 63 77 67
E(w1) 247 270 235 250 240
E(w1(e1)) 176 190 168 178 172
E(w1(e2)) 235 256 223 237 229
E(w1(e3)) 263 288 250 266 257
E(w1(e4)) 269 294 255 271 261
E(w1(e5)) 293 321 278 296 285
V (w1) 1,796 2,274 1,590 1,853 1,673
E(V (w1je)) 198 236 171 203 182
E(d0) 30 38 27 31 28
E(d1) 35 44 34 37 35
E(c0) 83 89 78 83 80
E(c1) 206 221 191 209 200
E(c2) 235 250 220 236 227
29when general equilibrium changes in interest rates and skill prices are taken into account.
4.2 Labor Income Taxation
The e®ect of labor income taxation on human capital formation is the subject of an extensive
literature, which generally assumes that perfect capital markets exist.17 Taxes a®ect the net return
and net cost of human capital allocation as well as the resources available to agents in each point
of their life cycle. In our model, taxes also a®ect the credit constraints.
It is well known that if all the costs of human capital investment are in the form of foregone
earnings, then the partial equilibrium e®ect of a proportional tax on earnings is neutral. Tax impacts
in general equilibrium models with perfect credit markets are also negligible. [15, 17, 26, 44, 45] This
is because a proportional tax on earnings reduces both the costs and bene¯ts of human capital at the
same rate. More generally, the response of unconstrained agents to a tax on labor income depends on
the relative importance of foregone earnings versus other investments costs. In our model, all costs
are from foregone consumption goods, so an increase in labor taxes reduces the returns to investment
without a®ecting the costs (ignoring general equilibrium e®ects through changes in the return on
capital and labor); labor income taxes should, therefore, reduce investment and consumption for
unconstrained agents. Among constrained individuals, consumption and investment pro¯les will
be a®ected by the tightening of credit constraints (assuming individuals cannot default on the tax
due to the government). The fact that the government captures part of the returns from human
capital investment reduces individual incentives to repay ¯nancial liabilities.
Holding interest rates constant, wage taxes will not change the constraint factors ¹ and ·1.
However, allowable debt will decline by the factor 1¡¿ since future earnings capacity is reduced by
that amount. To the extent that investment also declines, future earnings capacity is reduced even
further causing additional restrictions on credit. The ¯nal general equilibrium e®ects will depend
on the form of the production function and the relative importance of income and substitution
e®ects on savings, which determines the responsiveness of w and R.
The impacts of an increase in tax rates can easily be examined in our calibrated base economy.
In this economy, a 1% increase in the wage tax rate produces negligible e®ects on investment and
borrowing limits when w and R are held constant.18 However, once the price of human capital
and interest rates are allowed to equilibrate, the model predicts a $1 decline in borrowing limits
for youth and young workers and a $3 decline in investment. Thus, general equilibrium e®ects
are important, and once considered, they suggest that an increase in the wage tax rate leads to
important declines in borrowing and investment.
17See, e.g. [7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 45]
18We no longer balance the budget in this experiment, since we want to identify the impacts of a change in tax
rates alone.
304.3 Public Provision of Human Capital
We brie°y consider two separate forms of government schooling interventions that combine to create
a more general schooling policy that roughly corresponds to that of the United States. In the ¯rst
intervention, government freely provides a lump-sum amount of schooling to everyone. In the
second, the government provides a proportional subsidy to the expenses incurred by young agents
in human capital production. The current U.S. education system contains features from both of
these policies, as re°ected in our base economy.
4.3.1 Public Schooling
To consider the case for public schooling, assume that labor income taxes (¿) are allocated to provide
all young agents with a minimum level of human capital, y0. In this case, private investments are
additions to y0. In a stationary equilibrium, a self-¯nanced public investment provision program
requires that y0 = ¿wH. The young agent's problem becomes
V0(a;e) = max
f(d0;y): d0··1(1¡¿)we(y0+y)®g
fu(a + d0 ¡ y) + ¯V1((1 ¡ ¿)we(y0 + y)®;d0)g: (4)
As previously discussed, proportional taxes reduce the unconstrained optimal investment amounts.
As a result, those agents that were not credit constrained and invested more than y0 will reduce
their human capital. The direct e®ect of an increase in y0 on other agents, poorer and/or less able,
is to increase their human capital. The endogeneity of the credit constraints also has an e®ect on
them: since the government program increases their earnings potential, these agents are more able
to obtain credit, which further increases their human capital.
The redistribution across agents can be signi¯cant. The inequality in earnings and wealth is
reduced. The e®ect on aggregate capital stocks depends on the distribution of agents on A £ E.
4.3.2 Subsidies to Education
Now, assume that labor income taxes are used to ¯nance a proportional subsidy, º, on the schooling
expenses of young agents. Thus, the self-¯nancing constraint requires that º
R
A£E y(a;e)¸(da £
de) = ¿wH. Young agents deciding how much to invest in human capital must solve the problem
V0(a;e) = max
f(d0;y): d0··1(1¡¿)wey®g
fu(a + d0 ¡ y(1 ¡ º)) + ¯V1((1 ¡ ¿)wey®;d0)g: (5)
Abstracting from general equilibrium e®ects, the regime may increase or reduce the uncon-
strained investment depending on whether º Q ¿. Among constrained youth, subsidies encourage
investment, much like an increase in assets { they increase the amount of investment that can be
supported for a given level of debt. A more unique result of this model concerns the e®ects of the
policy on the constraints themselves. As above, labor taxes serve to reduce the amount of allowable
31debt, counteracting the increase in available funds from the subsidy. However, by encouraging hu-
man capital investments over consumption during youth, subsidies increase future earnings power
producing an indirect e®ect on the amount of borrowing allowed. The ¯nal impact of the combined
tax and subsidy policy on lending depends entirely upon whether after-tax earnings increase or
decrease.
We numerically analyze the impacts of an increase in the rate of subsidy to schooling to show
how our model of endogenous constraints responds. The base model is described in the calibration
procedure, and roughly corresponds to the current U.S. educational system. Investments are as-
sumed to be subsidized fully through y0 = 50 (i.e. the tenth grade) and at the rate º = 0:5 above
that level. Flat wage taxes are levied to balance the federal budget (i.e. to pay for the subsidies to
investment).
The base case equilibrium prices (w;R), wage tax rate (¿), aggregate human and physical capital
stocks (H;K), credit constraint functions (¹;·0;·1), and average subsidy amount are shown in
the ¯rst column of Table 8. The table also shows average investment amounts and earnings for
individuals of di®erent ability (ej) levels. Average debt, savings, and consumption are also shown
at di®erent ages.
Table 8 reports the impacts of increasing the rate of subsidy, º, to 0:55 in both partial and
general equilibrium. Column 1 re°ects the base case equilibrium. Column 2 shows the partial
equilibrium changes when the prices of human and physical capital are held constant (the tax rate
is allowed to adjust to maintain a balanced budget). These results re°ect the direct impacts of an
increased subsidy on decisions and credit constraints. The ¯nal column of the table reports the
new general equilibrium values once w and R are allowed to change, showing the added impact of
changing prices on decisions and constraints.
In response to the increased rate of subsidization, human capital investment increases by nearly
20% resulting in a 13% increase in aggregate human capital. Holding w and R (and, therefore, ·1
and ¹) constant, the amount of debt held by youth and young workers increases by about 10%.
This is because individuals respond to the subsidy by increasing their investment in human capital,
which increases their future earnings power (by about 12%) and relaxes limits placed on their
borrowing. The small increase in the tax rate is not enough to o®set these forces. The relaxation
of borrowing constraints also serves to increase investment in addition to early consumption.
The indirect e®ect of increased borrowing on investment is di±cult to measure, since credit
limits themselves are a®ected by investment. However, we suggest that this e®ect is not trivial.
Consider that a $1 increase in initial assets causes investment to increase by about $.80. Simply
treating the increase in credit as an increase in initial assets would imply an average increase in
investment of about $2.50, nearly one-third of the observed increase. We further discuss the role
32Table 8: Increased Subsidy on Investment
º = 0:55
Variable Base Case (º = 0:5) Partial Equilibrium General Equilibrium
w 12.2102 12.2102 12.2081
R 1.8009 1.8009 1.8045
¿ 0.0923 0.0967 0.0967
·0 -0.0860 -0.0860 -0.0850
·1 0.1323 0.1323 0.1319
¹ 0.0734 0.0734 0.0733
H 63 71 71
K 40 44 44
E(subsidy) 71 83 83
E(y) 93 111 110
E(y(e1)) 77 91 91
E(y(e2)) 89 107 106
E(y(e3)) 96 115 115
E(y(e4)) 98 118 117
E(y(e5)) 103 124 123
V (y) 153 247 244
E(V (yje)) 74 121 119
E(w1) 247 276 275
E(w1(e1)) 176 195 195
E(w1(e2)) 235 262 261
E(w1(e3)) 263 294 294
E(w1(e4)) 269 301 300
E(w1(e5)) 293 328 327
V (w1) 1,796 2,357 2,341
E(V (w1je)) 198 282 280
E(d0) 30 33 33
E(d1) 35 39 39
E(c0) 83 88 88
E(c1) 206 229 228
E(c2) 235 262 261
33of endogenous debt constraints in the next subsection.
The increase in human capital investment drives down the price of human capital in column 3,
though the change is quite small. Interest rates also increase slightly. Because prices change very
little in general equilibrium, changes in the constraint factors ·1 and ¹ are negligible. As a result,
changes in allowable debt are almost entirely due to changes in investment and not changes in
prices or the amount of debt allowed for any given amount of future earnings. General equilibrium
e®ects play little role in the measured responses to an increase in the rate of subsidy.
It is signi¯cant that these results imply that borrowing limits should be relaxed when education
subsidies are increased. This is in direct contrast to the standard discussion of federal student loan
and subsidy policy, which generally assumes there is a trade-o® between the two.
4.4 Comparing Exogenous and Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
We next analyze the role of the endogenous nature of debt constraints in determining levels of
human capital investment. Table 9 compares the role of ability, initial assets, wage taxes, and
investment subsidies in our model of endogenous constraints with a model that assumes exogenous
borrowing constraints. To focus on the role of the constraints, all parameters, including ¿, R, and
w, are held ¯xed at their base case levels. The ¯rst column reports optimal investment, levels of
debt, dy=da, dy=de, dy=dº, and dy=d¿ for someone with the median ability (e = 1:3054) and average
amount of initial assets (a = 74:30) in the base case endogenous constraint economy. Column two
reports the optimal level of investment along with the same comparative statics in an exogenous
constraint model with d0 and d1 set to the same levels of debt in the endogenous constraint model.
Thus, the only di®erence between the two columns is the endogenity of the credit constraints.19
Notice that investment is nearly 25% higher in the endogenous constraint model. Treating debt
constraints as exogenous would cause one to overstate the degree of under-investment in human
capital caused by credit market imperfections. Di®erences in investment behavior are entirely due
to the additional incentives to invest created by the link between endogenous debt constraints and
the amount of investment.
Investment also increases much more with initial assets (34% more) in the endogenous constraint
model. Again, this di®erence re°ects the fact that constrained individuals with higher initial assets
will, all else equal, invest more in their human capital. This relaxes borrowing constraints in the
endogenous constraint framework, which further increases investment.
While investment also increases with ability in the endogenous constraint framework, it is
decreasing in ability when the constraints are exogenous. The exogenous constraint framework
predicts that more able individuals will invest less in their human capital given any level of initial
19While not shown, the same patterns emerge for all other combinations of a and e in our model economy.












Notes: Levels of debt for the exogenous
constraint economy are set to be the
the same as those determined in the
endogenous credit market economy.
assets. This is because a higher ability improves future earnings and consumption, which makes
consumption while young relatively more valuable. When debt constraints are endogenous, this
e®ect is more than o®set by the increased capacity to borrow resulting from a greater future earnings
capacity.
Finally, investment responses to education subsidies are 73% greater in the endogenous con-
straint model, while responses to wage taxes are less than half those of the exogenous constraint
framework. Thus, taxing income to subsidize investment will have much more positive impacts on
human capital investment when borrowing constraints are endogenously determined from default
incentives than when they are assumed to be exogenous.
One can also use these comparisons to decompose the e®ects of policy or endowments on invest-
ment in the endogenous constraint model. For example, the endogenous constraint model predicts
that a one dollar increase in initial assets raises investment in human capital by about 78 cents.
From the exogenous constraint comparative statics, we observe that about 58 cents of that increase
would occur if debt levels were held constant. Therefore, about 25% of the total increase in in-
vestment can be traced to the endogenous nature of the constraints. The same decomposition is
useful when analyzing the response to education subsidies, which suggests that about 42% of the
increase in investment comes from the endogeneity of debt constraints. These contrasts are stark
and clearly argue for more carefully analyzing the sources of borrowing constraints. Not only do
the two models predict very di®erent levels of investment for any given amount of observable debt,
but they also predict very di®erent correlations between investment and individual ability and as-
35set endowments. Policy responses to investment subsidies and wage taxes are also substantially
di®erent in the two models.
5 The Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) Program
This type of model can also be used to study the implications of government supported loan
programs such as the U.S. GSL program. The GSL program includes some features of the e±cient
contracts in our model. Indeed, individuals are allowed to borrow more if they attend school for
a longer time period. To this extent, student loan initiatives o®er greater borrowing limits to
those acquiring more human capital. But limits should also depend on other factors that a®ect
future earnings capacity. In practice, the loan amount o®ered to a student will loosely depend
on his future earnings capacity, since government loan amounts are tied to the tuition cost of the
university attended, which depends on both the student's ability and the quality of the institution.
However, the GSL program does not directly adjust loans to individual ability, which could be
assessed (albeit, imperfectly) with previous grades or standardized tests like the SAT or GRE. One
could imagine larger available loan amounts for individuals with better high school grades or SAT
scores. Other factors that a®ect future earnings capacity, such as choice of major, gender, race, and
family background do not factor into borrowing limits or terms, perhaps re°ecting other objectives
of policymakers. Overall, there is little reason to expect that borrowing limits adjust optimally in
response to di®erential incentives to default.
To examine the relationship between human capital investment, ability, and default under the
GSL program, we provide a brief analysis in a stylized government lending environment when
individuals face incentives to default as in the previous sections.20 In this section, we simply model
the GSL program by assuming that young agents can borrow a fraction of their expenditures on
human capital investment up to a speci¯ed upper limit. Lending is tied to investments which are
fully observable, as before.21
More speci¯cally, for an upper loan limit of dmax, assume that youth who invest y in their human
capital can receive a government loan of dg = minf(1 ¡ º)(y ¡ y0);dmaxg. Thus, all investments
up to yd = y0 + dmax=(1 ¡ º) can be fully ¯nanced through government subsidies and loans.
The government may have special rights to impose di®erent punishments (°g;Ág) on borrowers
that default and can set the interest rate at its discretion (Rg), funding any losses from the loan
program through taxes on earnings. In this respect, the program may simultaneously provide both
loans and subsidies to investment, much like the federal GSL program. For simplicity, assume that
(°;Á) = (0;1) for the private sector, so the government program is the only source of loans for
20A more detailed analysis of federal loan programs is carried out in Lochner and Monge [38].
21If investments are not fully observable, moral hazard problems arise in addition to ex-post default incentives.
36youth.
Because this system does not adjust lending for ability or other relevant observable information,
it will be subject to default. Figure 10 reveals the default regions for high and low ability borrowers
when government punishments and interest rates are set at the base case values and dmax = 60. The
¯gure displays the maximum level of debt that low and high ability agents (dlow;dhigh) can commit
to re-pay for each level of total investment. The dgsl line represents the loan amount individuals
can receive from the government system for each level of investment. At lower investments, dgsl
is below both dhigh and dlow, implying that individuals of all ability levels can commit to re-pay
small loans for which the amount of debt accrued is greater than dgsl. However, low ability agents
choosing to invest more than $108 and high ability agents choosing to invest more than $147 will
take out loans which they do not intend to re-pay. They will default.
Figure 10: Default Under the GSL Program





























The government can reduce default rates by lowering the maximum loan amount. By setting
dmax · 48, the government could avoid default by more able youth, though less able youth investing
more than $108 will still choose to default. Further lowering dmax below $29 could eliminate default
entirely but at the price of severely limiting the e®ectiveness of the program. More generally, default
may occur for all ability groups when maximum loan amounts are high, while for lower limits, more
able individuals will never choose to default.
It is important to recognize that default decisions will depend on the level of government
subsidies for schooling. Higher subsidies imply that larger amounts of debts will be re-paid for any
given level of investment, reducing default rates. For the parameterization in Figure 10, increasing
the subsidy rate by 5% would increase the investment amounts above which low and high ability
agents default by about $10 and $20, respectively.
37In this stylized model, as long as °g < 1, anyone who plans on defaulting will invest yd, taking
out the maximum loan amount. This is easily understood by considering someone who decides to
default and must determine whether to invest y < yd or to invest more. He can invest more at no
cost to current consumption, since any expenditures are o®set by additional lending. However, if
°g < 1, future consumption unambiguously increases with investment. The restriction on future
borrowing does not depend on the amount he defaults on, and he will have no assets to seize during
his ¯rst period of work. The only punishment that varies with the default amount is the wage
garnishment, which increases with the loan amount and investment since future earnings increase.
But, this ¯nancial punishment increases less than future earnings in response to any investment,
making it optimal to invest and borrow as much as possible up to the limits yd and dmax.
To further study the decision to default, consider agents with low initial wealth levels, a, such
that their own assets are used only for consumption and their human capital investments are
¯nanced entirely from government subsidies and loans. All individuals who would choose to invest
less than yd fall into this category. These agents will choose an investment and consumption pro¯le
that does not involve default on their student loans as long as
u(a) + ¯ max
y:y·yd
V1((1 ¡ ¿)wey®;(1 ¡ º)(y ¡ y0)) < u(a) + ¯V d
1 ((1 ¡ ¿)weyd
®); (6)
where V1(w1;d0) and V d
1 (w1) are described by equations (1) and (2), respectively. Because poorer
individuals consume all of their initial wealth and use government subsidies and loans to ¯nance
investment, variations in a will have no e®ect on their future incentives to default. Thus, among
the poor, changes in initial assets have no a®ect on their decision to default (as long as they remain
poor). This need not be the case for wealthier individuals who ¯nance some of their investment
from their own initial assets. The relationship between ability and default is more complicated and
need not be monotonic.22
A number of conclusions can be drawn. First, a program such as the GSL is subject to default
by not linking borrowing limits to investment returns. Second, it is possible to predict ahead of
time who is likely to default. (With no risk and full information, one can perfectly forecast who will
default.) Third, with low maximum loan amounts, only the least able are at risk of default. Finally,
decisions to default will depend on the rate of government subsidy to investment. Limitations of
this analysis include the implications that all defaults are fully predictable and that all individuals
who default choose to borrow the maximum. To address these shortcomings and better explain
empirical patterns in default, Lochner and Monge [38] introduce uncertainty in the returns to
22The condition in (6) divides individuals into ability regions in which it is optimal to default and into regions in
which it is not. For most reasonable parameterizations, we ¯nd a single cuto® level for ability below which all agents
default. However, for more extreme parameterizations, it is possible that the condition de¯nes multiple regions of
default, such that default is not monotone in ability. It is also possible to choose parameters so that everyone chooses
to default or so that everyone re-pays.
38human capital investment in a more extensive study of the GSL program.
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed a framework for studying human capital decisions and the endogenous
formation of credit constraints that arise out of individual incentives to default and the capacity
of lenders to punish those who do. The amount of debt lenders will provide, therefore, depends on
the costs imposed by available punishments. The individual costs of any given punishment strategy
are likely to vary across the population and over the life cycle. Those who face greater costs from
any type of punishment will be given greater access to credit, since lenders understand that those
borrowers are more likely to repay their debts in order to avoid punishment. We demonstrate that
if lenders can seize a fraction of defaulting borrowers earnings and/or savings, then the amount
of debt lenders will extend to borrowers depends on their future earnings capacity. More able
individuals will be extended more credit, because potential punishments are more costly for them.
Lenders will also extend greater credit to those who invest more in their human capital for the same
reason. Furthermore, credit limits will vary over the life cycle, re°ecting changes in the individual
cost of default punishments. In our calibrated economy, allowable debt increases with age as both
savings and earnings increase.
Not only do borrowing constraints vary in the population, but they are also in°uenced by
government policy and macroeconomic forces. Policies that increase the returns to investment (e.g.
education subsidies) should increase the amount of credit lenders extend, since individuals will
optimally choose to invest more in their human capital, increasing their future earnings capacity.
Thus, more extensive loan programs should go hand-in-hand with increased subsidies for schooling.
This sheds new light on the standard discussion that posits a tradeo® between lending and subsidies.
Interest rates and the return on human capital are also important determinants of credit limits.
Higher interest rates make it more di±cult for borrowers to re-pay their loans, so lenders should
respond by restricting credit. Higher wage rates have the opposite e®ect. Thus, it may be important
to consider general equilibrium e®ects of government policy on credit constraints. While we ¯nd
this channel relatively unimportant in our study of school subsidy policy, it is extremely important
for analyzing the impacts of changes in bankruptcy laws.
The insights learned from studying the endogenous formation of borrowing constraints in ef-
¯cient credit markets can be useful for improving federal student loan programs. They may also
be useful for predicting who is likely to default in our current college ¯nance system. While the
GSL program has some features of an e±cient credit market (e.g. the amount of loans o®ered is
tied to the quantity and, indirectly, quality of education), it does not fully adjust credit limits to
re°ect di®erences in future earnings capacity. Whether this results in over- or under-investment in
39human capital is not immediately obvious. It is possible that limits are too stringent on more able
individuals choosing lucrative careers and too lax on less able students choosing careers with little
¯nancial return. This is an open empirical question worth studying.
Much can be learned from taking the origin of borrowing constraints more seriously. In com-
paring our endogenous constraint model with a model assuming exogenous borrowing constraints,
we ¯nd that for any level of observable debt, human capital investment is substantially greater
when constraints are endogenous. The model with exogenous constraints predicts that ability and
investment should be negatively correlated, in sharp contrast to empirical ¯ndings and the predic-
tions of the endogenous constraint model. Finally, the endogenous constraint model predicts much
larger impacts from an education subsidy and smaller impacts from a wage tax on human capital
investment. Assuming constraints are exogenous is not an innocuous simpli¯cation.
Future research should focus on better understanding the precise punishments creditors have
at their disposal. It is also important to consider the role of uncertainty about the future and,
perhaps, private information in determining the optimal structure for credit markets. In addition
to adding realism, incorporating these factors will be helpful for determining the optimal system
of punishment as well as who chooses to default.
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44Table A-1: Total Schooling Costs by Year of School and AFQT Quintile (1999 dollars)
Years of Direct Total Expenditures
School Expenditures Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
8 41,505 41,505 41,505 41,505 41,505 41,505
9 45,836 45,836 45,836 45,836 45,836 45,836
10 50,001 52,444 53,166 53,705 53,708 53,939
11 54,005 59,214 60,754 61,903 61,908 62,401
12 57,856 66,162 68,617 70,450 70,458 71,244
13 68,372 80,110 83,579 86,169 86,181 87,292
14 78,485 93,982 98,563 101,983 101,999 103,465
15 88,208 107,781 113,567 117,886 117,906 119,758
16 97,558 121,094 128,579 133,862 133,887 136,152
17 106,547 134,719 143,575 149,881 149,911 152,614
18 115,191 148,227 158,520 165,900 165,935 169,099
19 123,503 161,587 173,373 181,866 181,906 185,548
20 131,495 174,762 188,080 197,717 197,763 201,894
Notes:
1) Direct expenditures assume average expenditure per pupil in primary and secondary
schooling through grade 12. Additional expenditures for higher grades are taken from
average expenditures per student in all colleges and universities. [41]
2) Foregone earnings are calculated from a regression of log wage income on AFQT
quintile, education indicators, experience and experience-squared. Foregone earnings
are based on someone with 9 years of schooling plus the corresponding level of
experience. Total costs equal direct expenditures plus foregone earnings. See
text for details.
3) Cost measures are discounted at a 4% annual interest rate beginning with school
entry.
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